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rent populations, as a plausible source of exogenous variations for indicators of economic insti-
tutions. While genetic diversity has a robust, concave and signiﬁcant effect on economic
institutions, reduced-form regressions and numerous falsiﬁcation tests ostensibly suggest that
genetic diversity affects development only via indices of multidimensional measures of eco-
nomic institutions. Second-stage results indicate that allowing for cognitive skills, latitude
and ethno-diversity, economic institutions exert a positive and strongly statistically signiﬁcant
effect on development. These ﬁndings are robust to the inclusion of deep and proximate
growth determinants, different measures of geography, institutions, and horse races between
cognitive skills and economic freedom, as well as to the use of different estimators. Human
capital, gauged by cognitive skills, in most speciﬁcations is not signiﬁcant in the second
stage; however, it is positive and a strong signiﬁcant predictor of economic institutions in
the ﬁrst stage. The empirical evidence unveiled in this study lends credence to the primacy
of economic institutions hypothesis to ignite long-term growth and highlights the crucial role
of human capital in enhancing economic institutional quality.
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In this paper, we attempt to disentangle the role of human capital and economic institutions in development. There is consid-
erable controversy in the literature on comparative economic development over the treatment of human capital in growth regres-
sions. For example, North and Thomas (1973) contested other work by claiming that human capital, physical capital, and total
factor productivity are not causes of growth but rather embody growth—they should be considered measures of growth, or highly
proximate determinants of development. “The factors we have listed (innovations, economies of scale, capital accumulation, etc.)
are not causes of growth; they are growth” (North and Thomas 1973, p. 2). Subsequent papers by Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002,
and 2012) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) argue that institutions are the driving factor spurring technological innovation, as
well as human and physical capital accumulation. Following North and Thomas, Acemoglu and his coauthors consider1 Jenkins, Coral Gables, FL 33146, United States.
iami.edu (H.J. Faria).
. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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from their regression models.
Further controversy has stemmed from the observation that human capital and institutions themselves are considerably inter-
woven. Institutions are essentially ideas, which are generated by human capital. The production of ideas in turn is at least partially
stimulated by institutions that protect intellectual property rights; also, the portion of human capital generated in schools, which
appears to be substantial, depends partly on the institutional quality that governs the schooling system.1 Empirically, both human
capital and institutions have been shown to affect long-term growth, to be endogenous to development, and to be correlated.
Moreover, a simultaneous causality bias may afﬂict the relationship between these two covariates.2
To surmount the challenge of unbundling the role of human capital and institutions on long-term growth, we draw from three
distinct but related strands of the comparative economic development literature information on institutional quality, human cap-
ital and deep growth determinants. First, we educe from the institutions literature the Economic Freedom of the World index
(EFW) published by the Fraser Institute and developed by Gwartney, Lawson and Hall (2014), as our main indicator of institution-
al and policy quality. As a robustness check we also use the Social Infrastructure index (SII) introduced by Hall and Jones (1999)
and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank advanced by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) which
contains some dimensions of political institutions. These indices, in particular EFW, are more informative for policy decision mak-
ing than are unidimensional indicators, such as constraints on the executive, risk of expropriation, and rule of law.
Second, from the recent human capital research strand and following Hanushek and Woessmann, we use cognitive skills as
our proxy for human capital. Hanushek and Woessmann (2008, 2012a, 2012b) provide compelling evidence in growth regressions
indicating that cognitive skills are a better predictor of growth than years of schooling.3 At issue is the appropriate measurement
of human capital to cast light on the disappointing performance of years of schooling in explaining economic growth (Pritchett
2001 and 2006). However, using acquired skills rather than time in school dramatically improves the explanatory power of
long-run cross-country growth variation.
Third, from the literature on deep determinants of growth, we use latitude, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and genetic di-
versity, the last being determined tens of thousands year ago and therefore representing the deepest known development channel
other than geography.4 This paper uses genetic diversity—the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the relevant
population differ genetically from one another—as an instrumental variable (IV) for institutions. Speciﬁcally, henceforth we use
either predicted genetic diversity unadjusted for the ancestral composition of current populations, or, precolonial-predicted genet-
ic diversity.
An IV approach is necessary because proxies for institutions in cross-country OLS regressions are potentially afﬂicted by
endogeneity biases stemming from correlation of institutions with the error term due to measurement errors, reverse causality,
and omitted variable bias, which renders OLS estimates biased and inconsistent. The objective is for precolonial-predicted genetic
diversity, to induce exogenous variation in institutions, variation that is thus in principle uncorrelated with the error term, and
then to use this exogenous variation to calculate the parameter estimate for institutions.5 Unlike OLS estimates, IV estimates
are consistent if the IVs are exogenous, that is, uncorrelated with the error term.
But is precolonial- predicted genetic diversity itself correlated with the error term? If so, it could be affecting development
through channels other than economic institutions, which would invalidate our identiﬁcation strategy. In an attempt to prevent
this potential violation of the orthogonality condition, we control for human capital, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and lati-
tude.6 We allow for cognitive skills, given that genetic diversity is inseverable from human capital and that there is a growing
body of evidence suggesting that human capital has a direct effect on development (see Glaeser et al., 2004, Putterman and
Weil, 2010, and Gennaioli et al., 2013). Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, based on evidence supplied by Ashraf and Galor
(2013b), suggests that genetic diversity underlies multiple manifestations of cultural and ethnic fragmentation, which in turn
may have an effect on development.7 We also control for latitude because the level of genetic diversity is dependent upon migra-
tory distance from East Africa to the geographic region being examined, and geography may in turn potentially affect growth di-
rectly (Dell, Jones and Olken, 2014).
Additional results that strengthen our conﬁdence on the exogeneity of predicted-precolonial genetic diversity are based on
reduced-form regression results and on falsiﬁcation tests performed on measures of institutions that have received substantial
scrutiny in the comparative development literature. These tests suggest that precolonial- predicted genetic diversity, after
allowing for our control variables, neither affects development nor operates through political nor constitutional institutions1 For example, West and Woessmann (2010) and Hanushek and Woessmann (2012b) document that improving the institutional structure of the school system to
provide for more competition matters for the quality of human capital measured by cognitive skills test scores.
2 Glaeser et al. (2004)ﬁnd that initial years of schooling are a strong predictor of improving political institutions,while political institutions haveno impact on human
capital. Conversely, Acemoglu et al. (2014), allowing for historical determinants of institutions, do not uncover evidence of years of schooling predicting institutions.
3 An intuitive criticism of school attainment is offered byHanushek andWoessmann (2012b): “For example, a year of schooling in Peru is assumed to create the same
increase in productive human capital as a year of schooling in Japan” (p. 269).
4 Spolaore andWacziarg (2013) provide a survey of the recent literature on deepdeterminants of growth inclusive of geography.Nunn (2009) brings a related survey
on the role of history on economic development.
5 As will be explained later, we use a quadratic functional form of precolonial-predicted genetic diversity providing two instrumental variables, one given by the lin-
ear term and the other one by the quadratic term.
6 For the instruments to be exogenous they cannot be correlated with the error term in the structural equation given by the second-stage regression. If the instru-
ments are uncorrelated with the error term, the orthogonality condition (also known as the exclusion restriction) is satisﬁed.
7 See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a survey the literature on ethnic diversity and economic performance.
Please cite this article as: Faria, H.J., et al., Unbundling the roles of human capital and institutions in economic development, Eu-
ropean Journal of Political Economy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.08.001
3H.J. Faria et al. / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxsuch as democracy, constraints on the executive, constitutional review, judicial independence, autocracy, plurality, proportional
representation and government effectiveness. Additional falsiﬁcation tests conditioning for our controls also indicate that
precolonial-predicted genetic diversity does not affect human capital, social capital nor risk of expropriation, the latter being a
unidimensional measure of economic institutions.
In short, our baseline speciﬁcation allows for cognitive skills, latitude and ethno-linguistic fractionalization to control for
possible correlation of the instruments with variables that have been shown in the growth literature to affect development.
We hasten to add that not allowing for these covariates may violate the exclusion restriction, compromising the exogeneity of
the instruments.8
This study ﬁnds that the cross-country variation part of EFW, which can be traced back to our instrumental variables, exhibits
a positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect on development in the second-stage regression.9 Furthermore, cognitive skills do not
have a statistically signiﬁcant effect in the second-stage regression. Moreover, horse race regressions between economic
institutions and human capital, in which both are treated endogenously, suggest that clusters of economic institutions exert a
ﬁrst-order effect on development, whereas cognitive skills do not appear to matter directly for development.10 This ﬁnding
reinforces our results based on the treatment of economic institutions as the sole endogenous covariate instrumented which
are congruous with recent evidence provided by Young and Sheehan (2014) and Compton et al. (2014).
Our baseline estimates, obtained from a parsimonious yet informative speciﬁcation, prove to be robust to the inclusion of a
wide range of control variables. These variables are deep determinants of growth rooted in geography and long-term history,
adjusted for the ancestral composition of current populations, natural resource endowments, climate and proximate growth de-
terminants such as legal origin, social capital and different measures of economic institutions. In addition, the main results also
survive different samples, continent ﬁxed effects, horse races between cognitive skills and economic institutions, different IV
estimators and two-step bootstrapped standard errors.
Finally, our empirical analysis reveals that a ﬁrst-stage quadratic equation in genetic diversity affects development through
economic institutions, but not directly.11 Based on ﬁrst-stage regressions, we also determine that cognitive skills exert a robust,
strong and signiﬁcant effect on institutional quality in accordance with the notion of human capital promoting institutions
(Glaeser et al., 2004; Galor et al., 2009 and Galor, 2011). This ﬁnding, coupled with second-stage results, suggests that human
capital has an indirect effect on development inﬂuencing the quality of institutions.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure: The next section presents recent literature in the area of comparative
economic development related to our paper. Section 3 discusses our identiﬁcation strategy and presents evidence consistent with
the IVs exogeneity and relevancy assumptions. The fourth section displays our main results, and their robustness is analyzed in
Section 5. Section 6 reports ﬁndings based on speciﬁcations that treat both EFW and school achievement as endogenous variables.
The last section offers concluding remarks.
2. Review of the recent literature
The role that human capital and institutions play in the growth process is a contentious and intensely debated issue in the
recent comparative economic development literature. The seminal empirical contributions of Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and
Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2002) provided a major impetus to the primacy of the institutions hypothesis. How-
ever, Glaeser et al. (2004) report evidence suggesting that years of schooling, a proxy for human capital, is a better predictor of
development than Constraints on the Executive, which is a main measure of political institutions used by Acemoglu et al. (2001
and 2005) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005).
Acemoglu and Dell (2010) document in a sample of the Americas that approximately half of between-country and between-
municipality income differences can be ascribed to human capital variations and that institutions play a more modest role. More
recently, Gennaioli et al. (2013) disclose that human capital plays a ﬁrst-order role in explaining regional differences in develop-
ment, whereas institutions lack predictive power of per capita income in regions within countries.
Acemoglu et al. (2014) show that institutions gauged by rule of law outperform years of school attainment when both
variables are treated as endogenous or when controlling for historical determinants of both human capital and institutions. For
concreteness, in Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) regressions, institutions become a robust predictor of development, allowing
for historical determinants of human capital. However, in regressions that control for historical determinants of institutions, esti-
mates associated with human capital either decline to levels consistent with Mincerian microeconomic evidence or become
insigniﬁcant.
In a sequence of papers, Hanushek and Woessmann (2008, 2012a and 2012b) use cognitive skills, also known as school
achievement, as a proxy for human capital. Applying TSLS and Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimators,8 Although cognitive skills and ethno-linguistic diversity are potentially endogenous to income, inclusion of these controls variables does not invalidate our analysis,
provided that we do not interpret as causal parameter estimates associatedwith these controls in the second stage. The coefﬁcient on the variable of interest, EFW,may
have a causal interpretation in so far, the exogeneity assumption of the instruments is satisﬁed.
9 This result is robust to the employment of the social infrastructure index (SII) as another proxy for a cluster of economic institutions. In the robustness section we
will summarize results pertaining to the SII and WGI indices, which are available in Sections F and G of the online Appendix.
10 Cognitive skills are instrumented using the identiﬁcation strategy developed by Hanushek and Woessmann (2012a, b))
11 Asmentioned above, falsiﬁcation tests and reduced-form regression results lend credence to the notion that precolonial- predicted genetic diversity impacts devel-
opment through the channel of clusters of economic institutions in congruence with our theoretical reasoning.
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(2013), using ancestry-adjusted deep determinants of growth as instrumental variables for institutions, which are measured
by multidimensional indices such as the World Bank's World Wide Governance Indicators, ﬁnds in a TSLS empirical framework
that institutions predict development, even allowing for years of schooling, which are not signiﬁcant. Thus most papers in the
comparative development literature generally ﬁnd that either institutions or human capital matter for development, but not
both, in spite of empirical evidence suggesting that these two variables are important determinants of long-term growth.
Ashraf and Galor (2013a) are the ﬁrst to use genetic diversity data in the economic development literature, and they propose
the existence of a genetic channel that impacts long-term economic growth. In reduced form regressions Ashraf and Galor ﬁnd
that genetic diversity determined tens of thousands of years ago has a hump-shaped impact on precolonial population density
as well as on contemporary income. This non-monotonic and concave effect reﬂects the trade-off emanating from inimical
and favorable consequences of diversity on productivity. High levels of heterogeneity raise the probability that a society
will be dysfunctional due to distrust and diminished cooperation. But production efﬁciency and technological innovation
in a society can be enhanced by the presence of a wide array of complementary traits. Thus low diversity levels within in-
digenous South American populations and high levels of diversity in African populations seem to have hindered economic
progress, while the intermediate diversity levels of Asian and European populations appear to be more propitious for
economic development.
Following Ashraf and Galor (2013a, b), a burgeoning body of empirical work has emerged to study the inﬂuence of genetic
diversity on comparative economic performance of nations and societies. We will refer to the three papers most closely related
to ours. Arbatli, Ashraf and Galor (2015), document the incidence of genetic diversity on the emergence of civil conﬂict, intensity
of social unrest and intragroup factional conﬂict over the last half-century.
Depetris-Chauvin and Ozak (2015), uncover an inﬂuential channel from population diversity to economic specialization and
trade among pre-modern societies. They also provide empirical evidence suggesting that pre-modern societies displaying high
levels of economic specialization, today show larger occupational heterogeneity and greater development as well. Finally, Galor
and Klemp (2015), empirically show that genetic diversity contributed to the emergence of autocratic political institutions, con-
ditioning on potentially confounding effects of geographical factors as well as unobserved heterogeneity at the continent level.
These authors also uncover an effect of genetic diversity on contemporary variation of autocracy, consistent with the persistence
of institutions, culture and genetic traits. For an extended survey of this nascent and vibrant literature, see Ashraf and Galor,
forthcoming.3. Identiﬁcation strategy
3.1. A plausible exogenous source of economic institutional variation: Genetic diversity
Genetic diversity of any given population—for example, an ethnic group—is measured by population geneticists using an index
of expected heterozygosity. That is, expected heterozygosity measures “the extent of diversity in genetic material across individuals
within a given population” (Asraf and Galor 2013a, p. 13). This index may be construed as the probability that two randomly se-
lected individuals differ from one another in relation to an array of genetic traits like eye and hair colors. Thus, expected hetero-
zygosity has an interpretation formally similar to that of the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization and to most measures of
diversity (see Ashraf and Galor, 2013a).
The Human Genome Diversity Cell Line Panel assembled by the Human Genome Diversity Panel (HGDP) and the Centre d'
Etudes du Polymorphisme Humain (CEPH) is the most reliable and consistent source of genetic diversity data. Fifty-three ethnic
groups are covered, spanning 21 countries. These groups are aboriginal to their contemporary geographical location and have
been mostly isolated from interregional population movements as well as from genetic ﬂows induced by other ethnic groups.
To avoid restricting the research to a sample of only 21 countries, Ashraf and Galor (2013a) exploit prehistoric migratory
distance out of Addis Ababa in Ethiopia of anatomically modern humans.12 Speciﬁcally, given the high explanatory power of
migratory distance to account for observed genetic diversity within the aforementioned 21 countries, they generated
predicted values of genetic diversity for all countries of the world, employing migratory distance to overcome the paucity
of data.13
We claim that genetic diversity of precolonial ethnic groups, which was determined tens of thousands of years ago in the
course of the exodus of Homo sapiens out of East Africa, is a good instrumental variable for clusters of economic institutions,
viz., those measured by indices such as EFW. In fact, the humans who left East Africa seventy to ninety thousand years ago did
not know that as they settled in regions farther removed from Addis Ababa, measured by migratory distance, that their genetic
diversity was being diminished and that this variation in diversity would have an effect on measures of development such as pop-
ulation density in 1500 and contemporary income levels. This line of reasoning provides the foundation for our assertion that12 Ashraf and Galor appeal to the “Out of Africa” hypothesis, which holds that the human species evolved to its modern form in East Africa some 150,000 years ago,
then subsequently—circa 70,000-90,000 years ago—commenced an exodus from Ethiopia that populated the earth “in a series of stageswhere subgroups left initial col-
onies to create new colonies farther away, carrying with them only a portion of the overall genetic diversity of their parental colonies” (Ashraf and Galor, 2013a, p. 6)
and therefore diminishing genetic diversity of contemporary indigenous ethnic groupswith increasing distance from East Africa. Population geneticists have found em-
pirical evidence strongly supportive of this so-called serial founder effect (see Prugnolle et al., 2005, Ramachandra et al., 2005, and Wang et al., 2007).
13 Migratory distance explains close to 86% of the cross-group genetic diversity observed among the 53 ethnic groups which span 21 countries.
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assumption which is one of the two conditions that a valid instrument must satisfy.
Yet, after the onset of the Neolithic revolution circa ten thousand years ago, some regions of the earth experienced greater eco-
nomic development (as measured by population density in 1500) than others. One channel conducive for greater development
was the luck of being dealt more favorable biogeographic conditions; this is the Diamond (1997) hypothesis.
Another channel is genetic diversity, as proposed by Ashraf and Galor (2013a): the regions that prospered the most were
those whose inhabitants exhibited intermediate levels of genetic diversity. Further, a positive and high correlation exists between
EFW and measures of prosperity such as population density in 1500 and contemporary income. Thus, unsurprisingly, a strong cor-
relation is found between EFW and genetic diversity. This is the basis for the relevancy of genetic diversity, contributing to satisfy
the second condition for instruments' validity.
Notwithstanding our arguments on exogeneity of precolonial- predicted genetic diversity, the identifying assumption used in
this paper is that predicted genetic diversity, unadjusted for ancestral composition of the current population, affects income today
only via clusters of economic institutions, in particular EFW, after conditioning for human capital, geography, and ethno-linguistic
fractionalization. We use these controls to avoid invalidating our identiﬁcation strategy by virtue of omitting variables correlated
with genetic diversity (our IV), which also impact development. In other words, if genetic diversity affects contemporary econom-
ic development, either directly or via some other omitted channel, then our study would be ascribing to EFW the inﬂuence of
either the omitted covariate or of genetic diversity or both. That is, our IV would be correlated with the error term in the
second-stage structural regression.
Accordingly, we control ﬁrst for human capital because genetic diversity is “innately related to the very dawn of humankind
itself” (Ashraf and Galor, 2013a p. 2), and recent research studies highlight a direct inﬂuence of human capital on development,
(see Glaeser et al., 2004; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012a, b; and Gennaioli et al., 2013).
Second, we allow for latitude as a measure of geography because as previously indicated in footnotes 12 and 13, migratory
distance from East Africa had a detrimental linear effect on genetic diversity, implying that ethnic groups located farther away
from East Africa exhibited lower levels of genetic diversity. However, the migratory routes adopted were highly inﬂuenced by
geographic factors that may also have a persistent effect on today's income.14
Moreover, Diamond (1997) stresses the importance of initial bio-geographical and geographical conditions as important timing
determinants of the transition from hunter-gatherer societies into settled agrarian societies in which agricultural activity became
the main source of a population's sustenance. Thus, geographic variables in the Diamond hypothesis are ultimate determinants of
economic development, with a potential to affect development directly.15
Finally, we also account for ethno-fragmentation because Ashraf and Galor (2013b) have established empirically that genetic
diversity is a major determinant of numerous expressions of diversity, including ethnic diversity. In turn, the literature of compar-
ative economic development documents that ethnic diversity is a robust determinant of growth (see Alesina et al., 2003 and
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). Thus, to increase conﬁdence that variation on EFW induced by precolonial-predicted genetic diver-
sity is uncorrelated with the error term in the second-stage regression (which will allow the estimate of EFW to be interpreted
causally), we control for human capital, ethno-diversity and geography. Accordingly, our goal is to provide for conditionally
exogenous instrumental variables.163.2. Accounting for the concave effect of genetic diversity on EFW
Ashraf and Galor (2013a), seeking to explain the hump-shaped effect of genetic diversity on development, provide evidence
consistent with the notion that such diversity has both adverse and beneﬁcial effects on development. The detrimental effects
of heterogeneity are the consequence of increased levels of mistrust, disarray, and diminished cooperation, i.e., lower social
capital, which reduces productivity. The beneﬁcial effects of diversity are derived from the greater specialization and innovation
possible when a wider variety of traits are present in the population—productivity gains driven by more rapid knowledge crea-
tion. Accordingly, given the implicit hypothesized diminishing returns to both diversity and homogeneity, the theory predicts
an optimal level of diversity conditional on the development level.
However, we argue and present evidence strongly suggesting that after allowing for our control variables, predicted genetic
diversity unadjusted for the ancestral composition of current populations, i.e., precolonial-predicted genetic diversity, affects
development only through clusters of economic institutions and policies, which deﬁne the rules of the game in the economic
arena. We contend that mistrust, prejudice and group inﬁghting, driven by too much genetic diversity, inhibit agreements on
institutional traits that lead to evenhanded treatment of the population and that foster voluntary transactions. This is the case
for many sub-Saharan nations. Intermediate levels of diversity require sophisticated institutional arrangements to coordinate
the multiplicity of complementary traits. Such arrangements promote technological advancements, efﬁciency gains and high levels
of voluntary transactions. This level of genetic diversity would contribute to induce low and simpliﬁed taxation, regulations that
promote well-functioning markets, trade openness, protection of property rights and rules leading to sound money, among other14 Engermann and Sokoloff (2012) advance a hypothesis suggesting that geographical differences in the Americas had a critical effect on shaping institutional hetero-
geneity between North and South America, contributing to account for the income differences between the North and South. Dell et al. (2012 and 2014) provide evi-
dence of a direct effect of temperatures on income per capita and growth rates.
15 See Olson and Hibbs (2005), Putterman (2008) and Ashraf and Galor (2011) for supporting empirical evidence.
16 See Section A of the online Appendix for variables' deﬁnition, summary statistics and simple correlations among the variables.
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require complex multidimensional institutional arrangements to tackle a low number of tasks occurring in the economy. This is
the case for Bolivia, Paraguay, Venezuela and Central America.
This theoretical line of reasoning is advanced to explain the empirically supported non-monotonic hump-shaped effect of ge-
netic diversity on EFW which is disclosed below. That is, intermediate levels of genetic diversity are associated with higher levels
of EFW, while both high and low levels of diversity are associated with low levels of EFW.
3.3. First-stage functional form
Before presenting evidence consistent with genetic diversity satisfying the two assumptions of valid instruments, relevancy
(strong instruments) and exogeneity (affecting development only through EFW), we discuss the ﬁrst-stage functional form of
the two-stage least square estimator and of other IV estimators used in this research. This study exploits a quadratic ﬁrst-stage
regression in which the higher order term is genetic diversity squared, i.e., a higher order polynomial of a continuous instrument.
Several considerations have led us to use a non-linear transformation of genetic diversity in the ﬁrst stage. First, it is consistent
with our theoretical outline, which explains the role of predicted and precolonial genetic diversity in shaping different qualitative
clusters of economic institutions.
Second, we obtain an improvement of the ﬁt between clusters of economic institutions and genetic diversity, alleviating
functional form misspeciﬁcation problems. This ﬁt improvement may also lead to a greater precision, statistical signiﬁcance, of
the estimate of interest in the second stage.17 This is particularly relevant for the TSLS estimator, which delivers large standard
errors, given that only the variation in the endogenous variable that can be traced back to the instruments is used in the second
stage. In addition, greater variation of the endogenous regressor induced by the excluded instruments contributes to alleviate the
bias inherent to the TSLS estimator, which is consistent but not unbiased.18
Third, using a higher order polynomial in genetic diversity in the reduced form equation allows us to perform over-
identiﬁcation tests. Failure to reject the null of the Hansen test suggests that the TSLS estimates calculated using each instrument
separately are similar.
In summary, controlling for the inﬂuence of human capital, geography and ethno-linguistic fractionalization, we use a quadratic
equation in genetic diversity ﬁrst-stage regression to predict EFW. The intent is to uncover a causal link between economic
institutions and development, alleviating endogeneity concerns induced by simultaneity, (reverse causality), attenuation (due to
measurement errors) and omitted variable biases.
3.4. Formalization of our identiﬁcation strategy
The following equations formalize our TSLS identiﬁcation strategy described above:
First stage:EconInst ¼ α0 þ α1 GenDivð Þ þ α2 GenDivð Þ2
þψ1Latitudeþ ψ2ELF þ ψ3CogSkills
þX0ψþ ∈
ð1Þ
Second stage:
lGDP ¼ β0 þ β1EconInst
þγ1Latitudeþ γ2ELF þ γ3CogSkills
þX0γ þ u
ð2Þ
Eqs. (1) and (2) represent our ﬁrst-stage and second-stage regressions, respectively. As aforementioned, we allow for Latitude,
Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) and Cognitive Skills (CogSkills) and justify inclusion of these control variables to provide
for conditional exogeneity of the IVs.19 The vector X contains additional control variables such as deep growth determinants,
different samples dummies, continent ﬁxed effects, additional geographic covariates such as island dummies, climate and natural
resources, colonial origin, culture, armed conﬂicts gauged by an index of terrorism and an indicator for peace, as well as other
covariates commonly used in the empirical development literature. These variables are optionally added to our most parsimonious17 Using only the linear term in genetic diversity in our base speciﬁcation, the R-square of the excluded instrument is 0.114 Adding the quadratic term increases the R-
square of the excluded instruments to 0.2981 These results also alleviate concerns about thepotential presence ofweak instruments Angrist and Pischke (2008). Finally,
both parameter estimates on economic institutions are relatively close, 0.78 instrumenting onlywith the linear term versus 0.69 instrumentingwith both the linear and
quadratic terms.
18 See Wooldridge (2010), inter alia.
19 More precisely, our identifying assumption implies conditional mean independence, meaning that the conditional mean of the structural error term does not de-
pend on our IVs.
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(GenDiv) and its square make for the two-dimensional vector of excluded instruments, that is, excluded from the second-stage
structural equation model. This implies, as previously indicated, that it is assumed that they don't affect development directly
after controlling for all other included variables. We provide test results consistent with the exclusion restriction assumption
using several strategies based on reduced equations and numerous falsiﬁcation tests, as well as conditional exogeneity tests.
Our endogenous variable of interest is clusters of Economic Institutions (EconInst). We use the Economic Freedom of the
World (EFW) index as our main proxy for clusters of Economic Institutions. Our main dependent variable in this model is the log-
arithm of Gross Domestic Product per capita (lGDP), which is our proxy for contemporaneous economic development.
The ﬁrst coefﬁcient of interest, β1, measures the estimated direct and marginal impact of economic institutions on develop-
ment. The second coefﬁcient of interest, γ3, represents the marginal direct effect of human capital on development, after control-
ling for the quality of economic institutions and other covariates. The third coefﬁcient of interest,ψ3, estimates the direct effect of
human capital shaping economic institutional quality and thus its indirect effect on development. Therefore, if β1 is positive and
signiﬁcant, γ3 is not statistically signiﬁcant, and ψ3 is positive and signiﬁcant, we interpret this result as providing empirical sup-
port to the claim made by this study of disclosing distinct roles for human capital and institutions in economic development, that
is, evidence of an unbundling effect.
All other coefﬁcients are of interest as well, but they are not central to the research questions of this paper. Particularly impor-
tant, however, are α1 and α2. They determine the form of the polynomial in the ﬁrst-stage and thus they are fundamental for
interpreting our identiﬁcation strategy. For a hump-shaped effect of GenDiv on EconInst, which is predicted by our theory, we
expect α1N0 and α2b0.In addition, it is expected that the corresponding estimates are jointly statistically signiﬁcant, to the
point of mitigating weak instrument concerns, which can be further lessened based on results delivered by alternative IV estima-
tors which are robust to weak instruments. Moreover, allowing for the correct functional form enhances internal validity of the
statistical analysis. Finally, the terms ϵ and u are idiosyncratic error terms.
An additional consideration is in order, which pertains to the use of predicted genetic diversity as a regressor. We employ in
our reduced-form equations, falsiﬁcation tests and ﬁrst-stage regressions predicted-genetic diversity instead of observed genetic
diversity, basically to overcome the small sample size problem previously mentioned. However, use of predicted genetic diversity,
a generated regressor, in our regressions corresponds to the second step of a two-step OLS estimation procedure in which the ﬁrst
step consisted of applying migratory distance to estimate a regression coefﬁcient for genetic diversity.20 The second step consists
in using this coefﬁcient along with migratory distance to estimate genetic diversity of all countries of the world. Pagan (1984) and
Murphy and Topel (1985) show that coefﬁcient estimates in the second step are consistent but that inferences are invalid due to
inconsistently estimated standard errors. It is necessary to account for the extra variability by using predicted diversity instead of
observed diversity. We follow Ashraf and Galor (2013a) and apply a two-step bootstrap procedure to obtain consistent standard
errors in regression speciﬁcations that use precolonial-predicted genetic diversity. That is, we ﬁrst resample ethnic groups to pre-
dict genetic diversity with migratory distance and then resample predicted genetic diversity unadjusted for the ancestral compo-
sition of current populations, to estimate standard errors in regressions that use predicted genetic diversity as an explanatory
variable.213.5. Exogeneity evidence of our IVs
Turning to the evidence, column 1 of Table 1 in Panel A shows the unconditional effect of predicted genetic diversity, unad-
justed for the ancestry composition of current population, on log of income per capita in 2010. The results from this reduced
equation suggest a hump-shaped relationship between income and genetic diversity. Both the linear and quadratic terms are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This evidence is qualitatively similar to the ﬁndings of Ashraf and Galor (2013a).
Column 2 investigates the robustness of the hump-shaped result between income and genetic diversity when we allow for
EFW. Revealingly, genetic diversity does not impart a statistically discernible effect on development when the regression model
accounts for EFW. In effect, parameter estimates associated with the linear and quadratic terms of genetic diversity are not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, whereas the coefﬁcient estimated for EFW is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Reassuringly, these results suggest that predicted genetic diversity ancestry unadjusted and EFW belong to the same channel
of inﬂuence on development, in which genetic diversity and economic institutions are ultimate and proximate determinants, re-
spectively, of the log of income per capita 2010. However, most of the explanatory power of development allowing for genetic
diversity is captured by EFW, providing support to the claim that genetic diversity affects development indirectly using economic
institutions as an intermediating channel.
Results disclosed in columns 3, 4 and 5, which correspond to extended speciﬁcations, lend additional credence to the claim
that genetic diversity does not exert a direct effect on income when human capital, ethno-diversity and latitude are accounted
for in the regression models. Our measure of human capital is added in column 3, showing that genetic diversity remains not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, whereas institutions and human capital are positively strongly statistically linked to development.
Column 4 adds ethno-diversity, which is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, and column 5 additionally includes latitude,
which exerts a positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect on income per capita. In both columns 4 and 5, genetic diversity does20 See Ashraf and Galor, 2013a, pp. 15–16, and footnote 23 for details.
21 The algorithm used, data, and codes to replicate the results of the entire paper are available in the Replication Key folder located in the online Appendix.
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Table 1
Evidence on exogeneity of the instrumental variables.
Panel A. Reduced-form equations. Dependent variable is PWT 2010 log income pc
1 2 3 4 5
Genetic diversity ϟ 254.556*** 18.263 −57.765 −7.235 21.989
[66.934] [50.842] [47.952] [39.487] [42.850]
Genetic diversity squared ϟ −191.969*** −14.454 42.425 5.027 −17.737
[49.196] [37.822] [35.700] [29.619] [32.299]
Economic Freedom 1985–2010 1.030*** 0.593*** 0.566*** 0.507***
[0.087] [0.126] [0.117] [0.117]
Cognitive skills 0.527*** 0.374** 0.298**
[0.114] [0.146] [0.147]
Ethno diversity −1.255*** −0.974**
[0.367] [0.380]
Latitude 1.068**
[0.478]
Constant −74.610*** −3.174 22.799 6.964 −2.013
[22.596] [16.703] [15.639] [12.803] [13.791]
Optimum genetic diversity 0.663*** 0.632 0.681* 0.72 0.62
[0.008] [0.926] [0.405] [1.952] [0.597]
Adj. R-sq. 0.115 0.601 0.657 0.742 0.756
Observations 139 121 75 66 66
Replications 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Panel B. Falsiﬁcation test. Dependent variable is cognitive skills
1 2 3 4 5
Genetic diversity ϟ 148.587** 20.672 32.784 61.272
[59.520] [53.381] [54.301] [50.318]
Genetic diversity squared ϟ −106.536** −10.926 −20.076 −42.704
[43.572] [39.613] [40.512] [37.554]
Genetic diversity ϟϟ 274.606***
[51.242]
Genetic diversity squared ϟϟ −190.114***
[38.193]
Economic freedom 1985–2010 0.403*** 0.378*** 0.285*** 0.279***
[0.072] [0.091] [0.099] [0.103]
Ethno diversity −0.827** −0.462 −0.015
[0.360] [0.412] [0.403]
Latitude 1.137** 1.255**
[0.508] [0.543]
Constant −47.099** −7.36 −10.993 −19.67 −96.952***
[20.212] [17.541] [17.601] [16.335] [16.684]
Optimum genetic diversity 0.697** 0.946 0.816 0.717 0.722
[0.353] [4.060] [1.613] [1.326] [0.765]
Adj. R-sq. 0.265 0.463 0.543 0.573 0.609
Observations 83 75 66 66 65
Replications 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Two-step bootstrapped standard errors in brackets * p b 0.10, ** p b 0.05, *** p b 0.01.
Ϟ Predicted Genetic Diversity Ancestry Unadjusted.
ϞϞ Predicted Genetic Diversity Ancestry Adjusted.
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signiﬁcant at the 1% level, whereas human capital, ethno-diversity and latitude appear signiﬁcant at the 5% level..22
In Sections 4, 5 and 6 we show that in the ﬁrst-stage regressions, some of which allow for a rich set of controls, the link be-
tween EFW and genetic diversity exhibits a statistically signiﬁcant hump-shaped functional form consistent with the hypothesis
that genetic diversity's channel of inﬂuence on development is through multidimensional measures of economic institutions
and policies. However, it is possible that genetic diversity's true channel of inﬂuence is through human capital. To analyze this
possibility, we perform a falsiﬁcation exercise whereby cognitive skills are unconditionally regressed on genetic diversity, followed
by extended speciﬁcations that allow for economic institutions and other covariates used in our baseline speciﬁcation.
Results in column (1) of Panel B indicate that precolonial-predicted genetic diversity is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level,
exerting a hump-shaped effect on cognitive skills. However, accounting for EFW, shown in column (2), genetic diversity ceases to22 Reduced-form equation results using SII, reported in Section E of the online Appendix, are qualitatively similar to those using EFW. However, as shown in Section F
of the online Appendix, pre-colonial and predicted genetic diversity remains a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of income per capita, allowing forWGI, cognitive skills,
ethno diversity and latitude. Thus, genetic diversity appears not to be a good IV forWGI,which is consistent with the hypothesis, proposed in this paper that unadjusted
for the ancestry composition of current population genetic predicted by migratory distance out Africa only inﬂuences development through measures of multidimen-
sional economic institutions.
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and latitude, respectively, and genetic diversity remains not statistically signiﬁcant. This evidence lends additional credence to the
hypothesis advanced by this study whereby the effect of precolonial-predicted genetic diversity on development occurs through
the multidimensional economic institutional channel.
Ashraf and Galor (2013b) also construct a contemporary measure of genetic diversity which is predicted by migratory distance
out of Africa and adjusted for the ancestry composition of current population. This is the indicator of genetic diversity used in col-
umn 5 of Panel B. Revealingly, in spite of controlling for EFW, ethno-diversity and latitude, genetic diversity exerts a statistically
signiﬁcant concave functional form effect on cognitive skills. This result is instructive because it is consistent with the notion that
genetic diversity adjusted for post-1500 population ﬂows across national borders may also affect development through human
capital, leading us to discard this metric of genetic diversity as a good instrumental variable for EFW.
We also perform tests on indicators of political institutions, speciﬁcally on constraints on the executive, democracy, autocracy,
and government effectiveness, as well as on constitutional indicators namely, judicial independence, constitutional review, plural-
ity, and proportional representation.23 The results are qualitatively similar. Genetic diversity does not exert a robust statistical
effect on any of these indicators after allowing for economic institutions, latitude and ethno-diversity. However, when the depen-
dent variable is EFW, genetic diversity is statistically linked with EFW in a non-monotonic concave shape. These falsiﬁcation test
ﬁndings are reported in Section B of the online Appendix.
We also inquired whether genetic diversity affects risk of expropriation, which is a unidimensional indicator of economic in-
stitutions.24 Once again, the results, shown in Section B of the online Appendix, remain unaltered. That is, after allowing for EFW,
latitude and ethno-diversity, genetic diversity has no signiﬁcant effect on risk of expropriation.
We investigated as well, whether genetic diversity may be inﬂuencing development through social capital. For concreteness,
we use distrust as a proxy for culture.25 We ﬁnd that only in the extended speciﬁcation which controls simultaneously for
EFW, human capital, ethno-diversity and latitude does genetic diversity signiﬁcantly predict distrust. However, it does so at the
10% signiﬁcance level. These results are also reported in Section B of the online Appendix. Overall, we interpret these ﬁndings
as reinforcing the hypothesis that the channel through which precolonial and predicted genetic diversity affects development is
multidimensional indices of economic institutions.
Finally, we performed similar tests using SII, which is a multidimensional measure of economic institutions, and the WGI index
of the World Bank, which is a multidimensional index of economic and political institutions, as explained in the Introduction. On
the whole, we ﬁnd that results for the SII, available in the in Section E of the online Appendix, are similar although somewhat
weaker than those obtained using EFW. The results for the WGI, available in Section F of the online Appendix are generally
weak. These ﬁndings also contribute to bolster the hypothesis that predicted and precolonial genetic diversity affects development
only through multidimensional measures of economic institutions.4. Main results
Table 2, which portrays our basic development ﬁndings, offers the following structure. Panel A presents second-stage results.
Panel B shows ﬁrst-stage regressions using two-step bootstrapped standard errors. Panel C displays ﬁndings delivered by the
Limited Information Maximum Likelihood estimator (LIML), controlling for the same variables as in Panels A and B and using
the same IVs. Panel D contains OLS benchmark estimates, allowing for the same and corresponding controls used in Panel A.
Column 1 in Panel A contains results corresponding to our most parsimonious speciﬁcation. The parameter estimate on EFW is
0.695, positive and highly signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The estimate on cognitive skills is 0.165, positive and not signiﬁcant. How-
ever, regression coefﬁcients on latitude and ethno-linguistic fractionalization are positive and negative, respectively, and both are
signiﬁcant.
Column 1 in Panel B indicates that precolonial-predicted genetic diversity is strongly correlated with EFW. Both the linear and
quadratic terms are signiﬁcant at the 1% level, indicating that genetic diversity has a signiﬁcant humped-shaped linkage with
EFW. Latitude is also statistically linked with EFW, consistent with the notion that on average, countries located in latitudinal
bands farther from the equator possess better institutions. Ethno-diversity appears statistically unrelated to economic institutional
quality, which can be explained by the presence of genetic diversity, which is a determinant of ethno-diversity (see Ashraf and
Galor, 2013b).
Interestingly, the coefﬁcient on cognitive skills in column (1) of Panel B is positive and highly signiﬁcant at the 1% level on the
ﬁrst-stage regression. This evidence lends credence to the hypothesis of human-capital promoting institutions discussed in Glaeser
et al. (2004), Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) and Galor (2011).
Panel C discloses results delivered by the LIML estimator. If the instruments are weak, the LIML estimator is “median-
unbiased,” whereas the bias of the TSLS estimator can be severe, particularly when there are over-identifying restrictions. How-
ever, when instruments are strong, the LIML and TSLS estimators deliver similar estimates in large samples. Column 1 of Panel
C evinces parameter estimates on EFW (0.70) and cognitive skills (0.16) quantitatively similar as those extracted by the TSLS es-
timator in Panel A.23 These political and constitutional variables were employed by Glaeser et al. (2004).
24 Risk of expropriation was used by Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2012)
25 The measure of distrust was originally used by Aghion et al. (2010)
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exerts a direct effect on development, whereas human capital, gauged by cognitive skills, has a strong effect on economic institu-
tional and policy qualities. However, the non-signiﬁcant performance of cognitive skills in the second stage suggests that humanTable 2
Unbundling human capital and institutions in development allowing for deep determinants of growth.
Panel A. Second-stage results. Dependent variable is PWT 2010 log income pc
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Economic freedom 1985–2010 0.695*** 0.737*** 0.696*** 0.639*** 0.647*** 0.683*** 0.655*** 0.646*** 0.646***
[0.191] [0.192] [0.184] [0.137] [0.187] [0.184] [0.184] [0.148] [0.148]
Cognitive skills 1963–2003 0.165 0.08 0.093 0.012 0.189 0.179 0.117 0.071 −0.025
[0.172] [0.178] [0.189] [0.210] [0.167] [0.165] [0.171] [0.170] [0.239]
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization −1.079*** −0.907*** −1.017*** −1.044*** −0.854*** −0.830** −1.033*** −1.056*** −1.040***
[0.338] [0.317] [0.320] [0.294] [0.318] [0.323] [0.324] [0.295] [0.310]
Latitude 0.709** 0.807** 0.789** 0.644** 0.674* 0.439 0.676** 0.722** 0.870**
[0.319] [0.353] [0.349] [0.328] [0.350] [0.411] [0.340] [0.358] [0.386]
Agricultural transition 0.066 0.037
[0.054] [0.047]
State history 0.502 0.058
[0.345] [0.382]
Technology adoption 1.017 0.776
[0.749] [1.000]
Geo proximity to regional frontier 0.601 0.025
[0.469] [0.489]
Gen proximity to global frontier 0.629 −0.147
[0.429] [0.407]
Population density in 1500 0.015** 0.004
[0.007] [0.006]
Principal component 0.197
[0.131]
Observations 66 64 65 58 65 65 65 56 56
p(OID) 0.459 0.537 0.375 0.788 0.638 0.737 0.666 0.986 0.887
p(UID) 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.012
p(CLR) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.003
Robust standard errors in brackets *p b 0.10, **p b 0.05, ***p b 0.01
Panel B. First-stage with two-step bootstrapped standard errors. Dependent variable is economic freedom
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Genetic diversity ϟ 215.664*** 222.284*** 213.683*** 227.482*** 220.193*** 217.706*** 222.440*** 223.368*** 231.745***
[57.608] [65.785] [57.359] [58.546] [58.788] [57.517] [60.278] [61.689] [70.860]
Genetic diversity
squared ϟ
−164.979*** −169.972*** −163.550*** −174.249*** −168.126*** −166.258*** −169.873*** −171.115*** −176.902***
[42.636] [49.030] [42.568] [43.479] [43.510] [42.645] [44.707] [45.774] [52.743]
Cognitive skills 0.517*** 0.491*** 0.519*** 0.518** 0.493*** 0.512*** 0.457** 0.508*** 0.638**
[0.163] [0.180] [0.169] [0.233] [0.167] [0.172] [0.194] [0.192] [0.311]
Ethno-linguistic
fractionalization
0.138 0.185 0.124 0.237 0.304 0.287 0.158 0.272 0.279
[0.403] [0.445] [0.449] [0.514] [0.474] [0.488] [0.451] [0.491] [0.695]
Latitude 1.622** 1.789** 1.542** 1.797** 1.667** 1.269 1.696** 1.683** 1.226
[0.693] [0.821] [0.741] [0.786] [0.773] [0.785] [0.778] [0.801] [1.120]
Agricultural
transition
0.01 −0.018
[0.073] [0.140]
State history 0.054 −0.24
[0.456] [0.655]
Technology
adoption
0.038 −0.655
[0.968] [2.030]
Geo proximity to
regional frontier
0.465 0.289
[0.726] [1.304]
Gen proximity to
global frontier
0.458 0.633
[0.664] [1.388]
Population density
in 1500
0.008 0.004
[0.009] [0.011]
Principal
component
0.033
[0.191]
Constant −65.881*** −68.058*** −65.215*** −69.717*** −67.791*** −66.919*** −68.072*** −68.312*** −71.734***
[19.237] [21.965] [19.060] [19.462] [19.740] [19.136] [20.060] [20.438] [23.473]
Optimum genetic
diversity
0.654*** 0.654*** 0.653*** 0.653*** 0.655*** 0.655*** 0.655*** 0.653*** 0.655***
[0.010] [0.061] [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.012] [0.017] [0.029] [0.016]
Adj. R-sq. 0.496 0.476 0.491 0.505 0.496 0.491 0.494 0.486 0.442
Obs. 66 64 65 58 65 65 65 56 56
Replications 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Please cite this article as: Faria, H.J., et al., Unbundling the roles of human capital and institutions in economic development, Eu-
ropean Journal of Political Economy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.08.001
Panel C. LIML estimator. Dependent variable is PWT 2010 log income pc
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Economic freedom 1985–2010 0.70*** 0.74*** 0.70*** 0.64*** 0.65*** 0.68*** 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.65***
[0.19] [0.19] [0.19] [0.14] [0.19] [0.18] [0.19] [0.15] [0.15]
Cognitive skills 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.19 0.18 0.12 0.07 -0.02
[0.17] [0.18] [0.19] [0.21] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.24]
Observations 66 64 65 58 65 65 65 56 56
p(OID) 0.46 0.538 0.378 0.789 0.638 0.737 0.666 0.986 0.887
p(UID) 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.012
Robust standard errors in brackets. * p b 0.10, ** p b 0.05, *** p b 0.01
Panel D. OLS estimator. Dependent variable is PWT 2010 log Income pc.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Economic freedom 1985–2010 0.56*** 0.57*** 0.54*** 0.56*** 0.54*** 0.55*** 0.54*** 0.56*** 0.56***
[0.11] [0.11] [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.10] [0.09] [0.10]
Cognitive skills 0.25** 0.19 0.19 0.06 0.26** 0.27** 0.19 0.12 0.02
[0.12] [0.15] [0.16] [0.21] [0.12] [0.12] [0.13] [0.16] [0.25]
Observations 66 64 65 58 65 65 65 56 56
Adj. R-sq. 0.757 0.754 0.765 0.828 0.763 0.768 0.768 0.824 0.809
Robust standard errors in brackets. * p b 0.10, ** p b 0.05, *** p b 0.01.
Ϟ Predicted Genetic Diversity Ancestry Unadjusted.
Table 2 (continued)
11H.J. Faria et al. / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxcapital impinges on development mostly indirectly through its inﬂuence on institution building. A major endeavor of this study is
to assess the robustness of this result, which disentangles the role of human capital and economic institutions in development
and, more generally, to evaluate the robustness of our parsimonious basic speciﬁcation.
Columns 2 to 7 of Panel A add one at a time a different deep determinant of long-term growth, adjusted for population move-
ments across national borders. The only deep determinant with a statistically signiﬁcant regression coefﬁcient is population den-
sity in 1500, shown in column 7. The coefﬁcient estimate is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Results shown in Panel A of Table 2, corresponding to columns 2 to 7, reveal that in all cases, parameter estimates associated
with EFW are positive, statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level and stable across the six different speciﬁcations. Ethno-linguistic frac-
tionalization in every speciﬁcation is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Latitude is statistically signiﬁcant in the
six speciﬁcations considered except in column 6. Cognitive skills in no case are signiﬁcant in the second-stage regression.
Analyzing ﬁrst-stage results in Panel B indicates a statistically signiﬁcant non-monotonic relationship with EFW of genetic di-
versity, which is preserved in all ﬁrst-stage regressions reported in columns 2 to 7. Cognitive skills are also positive and signiﬁcant
at the 5% level or better in columns 2 to 7 of Panel B in Table 2. Latitude also is positive and signiﬁcant, except in column 6, gen-
erally suggesting that geography has both an indirect and a direct inﬂuence on long-term development. Finally, none of the deep
determinants, other than latitude, are signiﬁcant.
In column 8 of Panel A, we add the ﬁrst principal component of the deep determinants, and the results are qualitatively and
quantitatively very similar to those in columns 2 to 7. Column 9 exploits the coalesced explanatory power of the deep growth
determinants used in Table 2, which are simultaneously included. Reassuringly, results remain virtually intact when compared
to those of our most parsimonious speciﬁcation. Indeed, in the second stage, the exogenous component of EFW is positive and
signiﬁcant, with a parameter estimate of 0.646, nearly identical to the estimate found in column 1 of 0.695. Cognitive skills do
not predict development, whereas ethno-diversity is signiﬁcantly negative and latitude is signiﬁcantly positive. Furthermore,
LIML estimates displayed in Panel C are very similar to those delivered by the TSLS estimator, buttressing conﬁdence in our
ﬁndings.
The ﬁrst-stage regressions shown in columns 1 to 9 of Panel B offer an identical pattern. The linear as well the quadratic terms
of genetic diversity are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, and the optimal level of diversity, optimum genetic diversity, re-
mains virtually unchanged across all nine columns and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Cognitive skills, in columns (1) to
(9), predict better institutional quality, with coefﬁcient estimates signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better.
We also ﬁnd that in all speciﬁcations, the p-value for the over-identifying restrictions using Hansen's test is N10%, supporting the notion
of conditional exogeneity of the instruments, and the null of under-identiﬁcation is rejected in all nine columns at the 1% level or better. In
addition, we performed a conditional likelihood ratio test (CLR), introduced by Morreira (2003) and further reﬁned by Andrews et al.
(2007), which is robust to the presence of weak and strong instruments. The inferential Morreira test results reconﬁrm the TSLS ﬁndings.
Results are statistically signiﬁcant and economically signiﬁcant as well. Indeed, in Table 2, panel A, the estimated coefﬁcient of
EFW ranges from 0.639 to 0.737 and the number of the observations ranges from 56 (column 9, including all controls) to 66 (base
speciﬁcation). For the countries included in the regressions, the sample standard deviation of both EFW and the logarithm of in-
come per capita in 2010 are close to one. The model predicts that a one standard deviation increase in EFW translates into 0.7
standard deviation increase in the log of income per capita (0.67 is the number for column 1 and 0.71 is the number for column
2). A 0.7 standard deviation is the approximate difference in per capita income between the United States and Portugal. A unitary
EFW distance is approximately the difference between the United States and Norway (8.26–7.28, respectively, for the average
EFW from 1985 to 2010).Please cite this article as: Faria, H.J., et al., Unbundling the roles of human capital and institutions in economic development, Eu-
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coefﬁcients range from 0.4 to 0.53 rather than 0.5 to 0.64, as is shown in the table, which shows the non-standardized coefﬁcients.
That is, for columns 1 to 8, a one standard deviation increase in cognitive skills is associated with about 0.4 standard deviation
increase of EFW. For column 9, this number is 0.53. To give some perspective, the level of cognitive skills in Canada is 5.038
and that of India is 4.281. The difference of 0.76 is near one standard deviation of the sample of cognitive skills. About one stan-
dard deviation below India follow Botswana and Morocco, with values of cognitive skills of 3.575 and 3.327, respectively.
Overall, the ﬁndings emerging from Table 2 suggest that, accounting for a rich set of covariates drawn from the deep determi-
nants of growth literature, EFW retains its economic and statistical signiﬁcance, exerting a strong effect on development along
with ethno-diversity and geography. Moreover, human capital measured by cognitive skills has a consequential inﬂuence on eco-
nomic institutional quality, thereby inﬂuencing development indirectly. These ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis of an
unbundling effect suggested by this research. Finally, predicted-precolonial genetic diversity confers a clearly deﬁned hump-
shaped impact on EFW in congruence with the assumptions of relevancy and exogeneity of our IVs.5. Robustness checks
5.1. Different samples and continent ﬁxed effects
To save space we present a summary of the main ﬁndings, focusing on the parameter estimates of EFW, cognitive skills and
genetic diversity, the latter in the ﬁrst stage. Additional robustness checks results can be found in Section C of the online
Appendix.
Tables 3 and 4 offer a similar structure to Table 2. Table 3 investigates the sensitivity of our main ﬁndings to different samples,
exclusion of Neo-UK and Africa, and to continent-ﬁxed effects. The major ﬁndings are that parameter estimates on EFW remain
positive and statistically signiﬁcant predictors of development. However, the magnitude decreases somewhat when excluding
Africa, column (3), and allowing for continent ﬁxed effects, column (4). A result different from those reported on Table 2 is
that cognitive skills enters positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level in column (3) and at the 10% level in column
(4) in the second stage. These ﬁndings are corroborated by the LIML estimator in Panel C.
Panel B results suggest that the hump-shaped effect of genetic diversity on EFW remains statically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in
the new samples and controlling for ﬁxed effects at the continent level. Similarly, cognitive skills remain positive and statistically
linked to EFW at the 1% level, allowing for different samples and for unobserved heterogeneity at the continent level. Finally, in no
case is the null of instruments' exogeneity rejected at conventional levels, the null of under-identiﬁcation is rejected in all cases at
the 1% level, and reassuringly, the CLR inferential test results are congruous with those delivered by the TSLS estimator.5.2. Additional geographic covariates
Findings reported in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that geography, gauged by latitude, has a direct effect on development. Given
these results, Table 4 probes further the issue of geographic legacy on modern development, attempting to establish whether
the data largely support the view of a direct effect on development or an indirect effect working largely through the channel
of institutions and human capital.26 Meanwhile, Table 4 explores the robustness of our most parsimonious speciﬁcation to
other widely used geographic covariates, namely, distance to major markets, coastal populations, tropical climate and malaria
ecology.
A reassuring ﬁnding provided by this exercise, shown in Panel A, is that parameter estimates on EFW are positive, statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level and relatively stable. Coefﬁcient estimates on cognitive skills are not signiﬁcant. These results are rein-
forced by LIML estimates reported in Panel C.
Latitude only enters signiﬁcantly and at the 10% level in column (4), suggesting that it is not a robust predictor of development
when controlling for other geographic variables. Similarly, no other geographic determinant of development enters statistically
signiﬁcant in the second-stage regressions.
Panel B ﬁndings corroborate the persistent concave effect of genetic diversity on EFW, and the salutary impact of cognitive
skills and latitude on the quality of economic institutions. Larger shares of coastal population also appear to affect positively
the quality of economic institutions.
The Hansen test supports the claim that the IVs are exogenous except in column (1), in which the null of orthogonality of the
instruments to the sample errors in the structural second-stage regression can be rejected but at the 10% level. Moreover, the null
of under-identiﬁed instruments is rejected in all columns at the 1% level except in column (5), in which rejection is at the 5%
level. Taken together, the ﬁndings from Table 4 strengthen the view whereby geography's major effect on long-run growth is in-
direct and that our main results remain qualitatively unaltered.2726 Sachs (2003a, b) has argued that geography has a direct impact on development even allowing for institutions and other growth determinants. Bennett, Faria,
Gwartney and Morales (2015), allowing for several geographic indicators, report evidence that lends credence to a direct, as well as indirect, effect of geography on
development. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) provide a summary of this discussion.
27 Section C of the online Appendix, reports additional robustness checks controlling for climatic, land productivity, natural resources, colonial and culture covariates,
as well as presence of Islands and conﬂicts. The unbundling role of human capital and institutions in development remains qualitatively robust.
Please cite this article as: Faria, H.J., et al., Unbundling the roles of human capital and institutions in economic development, Eu-
ropean Journal of Political Economy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.08.001
13H.J. Faria et al. / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx5.3. Comments on OLS results and alternative measures of institutional quality
This study's methodological focus is on IV estimators. Nonetheless, we also brieﬂy comment on reported OLS estimates which
can be construed as benchmark results. Stability of OLS estimates on EFW is remarkable. Only ﬁve OLS estimates, out of thirty-six,Table 3
Unbundling human capital and institutions in development using different samples and continent ﬁxed effects.
Panel A. Second-stage results. Dependent variable is PWT 2010 log Income pc
Base sample Base sample w/o Neo-UK Base sample w/o Africa Base sample with continent ﬁxed effects
1 2 3 4
Economic freedom 1985–2010 0.695*** 0.758*** 0.413** 0.487**
[0.191] [0.241] [0.207] [0.198]
Cognitive skills 1963–2003 0.165 0.136 0.362** 0.318*
[0.172] [0.190] [0.182] [0.166]
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization −1.079*** −1.037*** −0.866** −0.690**
[0.338] [0.357] [0.354] [0.326]
Latitude 0.709** 0.737** 0.657** 0.617
[0.319] [0.349] [0.321] [0.467]
Africa −0.643***
[0.249]
Asia −0.231
[0.197]
Other −0.124
[0.273]
Constant 4.134*** 3.836*** 5.194*** 4.929***
[0.784] [1.022] [0.834] [0.945]
Observations 66 62 58 66
p(OID) 0.459 0.325 0.645 0.55
p(UID) 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.002
p(CLR) 0 0.001 0.036 0.035
Robust standard errors in brackets *p b 0.10,** p b 0.05,***p b 0.01
Panel B. First-stage with two-step bootstrapped standard errors. Dependent variable is economic freedom
1 2 3 4
Genetic diversity ϟ 215.664*** 208.316*** 188.933*** 217.352***
[57.608] [58.994] [61.617] [61.689]
Genetic diversity squared ϟ −164.979*** −159.119*** −145.264*** −165.872***
[42.636] [44.079] [45.980] [46.271]
Cognitive skills 0.517*** 0.493*** 0.651*** 0.533***
[0.163] [0.184] [0.190] [0.193]
Ethno diversity 0.138 0.115 0.358 0.171
[0.403] [0.456] [0.453] [0.461]
Latitude 1.622** 1.583** 1.340* 1.444
[0.693] [0.780] [0.715] [0.891]
Africa −0.039
[0.451]
Asia −0.126
[0.378]
Other 0.19
[0.270]
Constant −65.881*** −63.511*** −57.421*** −66.604***
[19.237] [19.638] [20.382] [20.431]
Optimum genetic diversity 0.654*** 0.655*** 0.650*** 0.655***
[0.010] [0.015] [0.067] [0.010]
Adj. R-sq. 0.496 0.42 0.455 0.473
Obs. 66 62 58 66
Replications 1000 1000 1000 1000
Panel C. LIML estimator. Dependent variable is PWT 2010 log income pc.
1 2 3 4
Economic freedom 1985–2010 0.698*** 0.772*** 0.414** 0.487**
[0.195] [0.255] [0.210] [0.201]
Cognitive skills 1963–2003 0.162 0.127 0.362** 0.318*
[0.174] [0.198] [0.183] [0.167]
Observations 66 62 58 66
Robust standard errors in brackets *p b 0.10,** p b 0.05,***p b 0.01
(continued on next page)
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Panel D. OLS estimator. Dependent variable is PWT 2010 log income pc.
1 2 3 4
Economic freedom 1985–2010 0.563*** 0.569*** 0.393*** 0.502***
[0.107] [0.115] [0.063] [0.095]
Cognitive skills 1963–2003 0.251** 0.246* 0.377*** 0.309*
[0.124] [0.124] [0.103] [0.163]
Observations 66 62 58 66
Robust standard errors in brackets *p b 0.10,** p b 0.05,***p b 0.01.
Ϟ Predicted Genetic Diversity Ancestry Unadjusted.
Table 3 (continued)
14 H.J. Faria et al. / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxfall outside the 0.5–0.6 open interval. For those exceptions, the estimates are 0.393, 0.462, 0.623, 0.623 and 0.616.28 Yet even these
estimates are not far apart from the aforementioned interval. This notable stability of point estimates allays concerns for selection
on unobservables. Moreover, all OLS estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level and generally lower in modulus than cor-
responding IV estimates, consistent with IV estimators correcting for attenuation bias. Finally, OLS estimates on cognitive skills are
more volatile and frequently are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Another robustness check performed in this study pertains to different measures of institutions. Results uncovered using the
SII, reported in Section E of the online Appendix, are generally qualitatively similar to those using EFW, albeit weaker. Indeed,
for all speciﬁcations reported in Table E2 which allow for deep determinants of growth, the test of over-identiﬁcation rejects
the null of conditional exogeneity at the 10% level in six out of nine different speciﬁcations, and at the 5% level in the three re-
maining speciﬁcations.
Robustness checks performed using the WGI of the World Bank, reported in Section F of the online Appendix, are also in gen-
eral qualitatively equivalent to those obtained using the EFW index, though weaker than those generated using the SII. As report-
ed in Table F1, income reduced-form equations suggest that in some speciﬁcations genetic diversity directly impacts development.
Moreover, ﬁrst-stage results indicate that genetic diversity is not persistently statistically linked to WGI, as it is to EFW and SII.
Given that WGI contains political dimension measurements, this evidence reinforces the hypothesis presented in this paper
that predicted-precolonial genetic diversity impacts development mainly through multidimensional measures of economic insti-
tutions and policies.
An additional salient difference, shown in Table F12 in Section F of the online Appendix, is that cognitive skills in three second-
stage speciﬁcations signiﬁcantly affect development but with a negative coefﬁcient estimate. This result is corroborated by LIML
estimates which are also negative, statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level and of a similar magnitude to corresponding TSLS
estimates.6. Horse race results
Summing across estimators and speciﬁcations, we have 72 s-stage estimates, of which only four cognitive skills estimates are positive
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better in predicting development. However, only three coefﬁcient estimates on EFW are not
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better. Nonetheless, these three estimates are positive and signiﬁcant at the 10% level.29
In spite of this overwhelming evidence supportive of a direct effect of EFW on development and scant direct impact on devel-
opment of cognitive skills, to cast further light on the issue of which development strategy matters most for a direct effect on
long-term growth, in this section we perform horse races between institutions and human capital. Thus, EFW and cognitive skills
are treated as endogenous regressors. EFW is instrumented with pre-colonial genetic diversity predicted by migratory distance
from Ethiopia, while cognitive skills are instrumented with the identiﬁcation strategy developed by Hanushek and Woessmann
(2012a, b). We use their two most frequently employed instruments, namely years of education in the 1960 and the population
share of Catholics in 1900.
Before discussing the results, we brieﬂy summarize the advantages and shortcomings of alternative estimators and tests ap-
plied in this section. In the presence of weak identiﬁcation, the TSLS estimator is afﬂicted by a ﬁnite sample bias and a non-
normal sample distribution. Consequently, the t-test for hypothesis testing and conﬁdence intervals are unreliable. One possibility
to surmount this problem in the presence of two endogenous variables is the Anderson-Rubin test. Using this test, we report the
joint signiﬁcance of the parameter estimates associated with the two endogenous variables.
We also make use of other IV estimators, which tend to be more centered on the true value of parameters under weak iden-
tiﬁcation. One such estimator has already been used in this paper, the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood Estimator (LIML).
A shortcoming of LIML is a considerable dispersion in the estimates, generating extreme outliers. The Anderson-Rubin conﬁdence
intervals are more reliable than conﬁdence intervals built with LIML standard errors and parameter estimates.
The GMM generalization of the LIML estimator is known as the Continuously Updated Estimator (CUE), developed by Hansen,
Heaton and Yaro (1996). The CUE estimator provides for simultaneous estimation of population parameters and the weighting
matrix. Simulation results indicate that this estimator generally offers a better performance than does the GMM two-step28 OLS estimates, reported in Section C of the online Appendix, are included among the indicated thirty-six estimates.
29 These results include those in Section C of the online Appendix.
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Table 4
Unbundling human capital and institutions in development allowing for additional geographic covariates.
Panel A. Second-stage results. Dependent variable is PWT 2010 log income pc
1 2 3 4 5
Economic freedom 1985–2010 0.659*** 0.748*** 0.738*** 0.666*** 0.736***
[0.178] [0.228] [0.181] [0.223] [0.237]
Cognitive skills 1963–2003 0.178 0.148 0.075 0.199 0.068
[0.168] [0.180] [0.167] [0.206] [0.206]
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization −1.028 −1.171 −1.053 −0.999 −1.026
[0.330] [0.365] [0.307] [0.400] [0.371]
Latitude 0.565 0.493 −0.022 0.630* −0.756
[0.383] [0.387] [0.659] [0.338] [0.870]
Distance to major markets −0.027 −0.046
[0.029] [0.032]
Coastal population −0.136 −0.135
[0.274] [0.262]
Tropical climate −0.474 −0.624
[0.326] [0.394]
Malaria ecology −0.011 0.001
[0.017] [0.016]
Observations 66 63 64 66 62
p(OID) 0.087 0.535 0.79 0.479 0.15
p(UID) 0.001 0.01 0.002 0.001 0.015
p(CLR) 0 0 0 0.001 0.001
Robust Standard errors in brackets *p b 0.10,**p b 0.05,***p b 0.01
Panel B. First-stage with two-step bootstrapped standard errors. Dependent variable is economic freedom.
1 2 3 4 5
Genetic diversity ϟ 236.005*** 159.033*** 226.640*** 215.831*** 193.595**
[67.042] [59.732] [63.275] [58.575] [83.797]
Genetic diversity squared ϟ −179.784*** −122.989*** −173.171*** −165.108*** −148.443**
[49.282] [44.364] [46.955] [43.417] [61.806]
Cognitive skills 0.496*** 0.516*** 0.480*** 0.517*** 0.444**
[0.174] [0.162] [0.181] [0.162] [0.200]
Ethno diversity 0.019 0.481 0.162 0.136 0.269
[0.442] [0.448] [0.449] [0.429] [0.567]
Latitude 1.777** 1.930*** 1.227 1.626** 2.009**
[0.742] [0.709] [0.922] [0.728] [1.013]
Distance to major markets 0.029 0.032
[0.058] [0.069]
Coastal population 0.706** 0.700**
[0.333] [0.343]
Tropical climate −0.265 −0.155
[0.442] [0.471]
Malaria ecology 0 0.011
[0.049] [0.066]
Constant −72.849*** −47.532** −69.142*** −65.933*** −58.903**
[22.554] [19.744] [20.804] [19.533] [27.770]
Optimum genetic diversity 0.656*** 0.647*** 0.654*** 0.654*** 0.652
[0.064] [0.075] [0.012] [0.011] [0.433]
Adj. R-sq. 0.491 0.541 0.488 0.488 0.518
Obs. 66 63 64 66 62
Replications 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Panel C. LIML estimator. Dependent variable is PWT 2010 log income pc.
1 2 3 4 5
Economic freedom 1985–2010 0.674*** 0.754*** 0.739*** 0.669*** 0.769***
[0.197] [0.234] [0.182] [0.227] [0.269]
Cognitiveskills 1963–2003 0.168 0.145 0.075 0.196 0.047
[0.179] [0.183] [0.167] [0.209] [0.220]
Observations 66 63 64 66 62
Robust Standard errors in brackets *p b 0.10,**p b 0.05,***p b 0.01
Panel D. OLS estimator. Dependent variable is PWT 2010 log income pc.
1 2 3 4 5
Economic freedom 1985–2010 0.560*** 0.531*** 0.564*** 0.551*** 0.521***
[0.103] [0.109] [0.101] [0.116] [0.112]
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Table 4 (continued)
Panel D. OLS estimator. Dependent variable is PWT 2010 log income pc.
1 2 3 4 5
Cognitive skills 1963–2003 0.242* 0.269** 0.189 0.281** 0.198
[0.130] [0.125] [0.136] [0.136] [0.171]
Observations 66 63 64 66 62
Robust Standard errors in brackets *p b 0.10,**p b 0.05,***p b 0.01.
Ϟ Predicted Genetic Diversity Ancestry Unadjusted.
16 H.J. Faria et al. / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxestimator, to the extent of exhibiting a smaller median bias and inducing more reliable over-identiﬁcation tests. Finally, the CUE
estimator is efﬁcient under general non-spherical disturbances. In our cross-sectional regressions, the major concern is with
heteroscedastic disturbances.
Table 5 displays horse race results between our measures of economic institutions (EFW) and human capital (Cognitive skills).
As indicated above, we instrument EFW with genetic diversity and cognitive skills with School Attainment (Years of Schooling) in
1960 and the Share of Catholic Population in 1900. In addition, we control for deep determinants of growth.
Panel A, which presents TSLS results, indicates a clear dominance of EFW. In fact, parameter estimates associated with EFW are
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. These results are reconﬁrmed by LIML estimates, except in column 9, and by
CUE estimates reported in Panels C and D, respectively.
The Anderson-Rubin (AR) test, which is robust to weak instruments, rejects the null of no joint signiﬁcance of the two endog-
enous variables at the 1% level. In addition, the fractionally resampled Anderson-Rubin (FAR) test, which provides valid inferences
under weak identiﬁcation and mild violations of the exclusion restriction, indicates that rejection of joint no signiﬁcance of EFW
and cognitive skills occurs at the 5% level.30
First-stage results for EFW and cognitive skills are displayed in Panels B1 and B2, respectively, of Table 5. For the EFW regres-
sion, we highlight that regression coefﬁcients corresponding to both terms of genetic diversity are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level in speciﬁcations shown in columns (1) to (8), and in column (9), which includes a rich array of deep determinant covariates,
the signiﬁcance of both terms is at the 5% level. The share of Catholics coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation. However,
years of schooling are positive and statistically signiﬁcant in all nine ﬁrst-stage regressions, consistent with the human capital pro-
moting institutions view. Latitude and ethno-linguistic fractionalization are not statistically signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation. In re-
lation to the deep determinants of growth adjusted for post-1500 migrations, no regression coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant.
For the cognitive skills ﬁrst-stage regression, years of education in 1960 is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level in columns 1
to 8, and in column 9, signiﬁcance is at the 5% level. Catholic share in 1900 is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level
in columns 2, 4, 7 and 8 and at the 10% level in columns 1, 5 and 6. However, in columns 3 and 9 the coefﬁcients on Catholic
share are not signiﬁcant. Genetic diversity is statistically signiﬁcant but not as robustly as in the EFW regression. For example,
in columns 8 and 9, neither term is statistically signiﬁcant.
Several coefﬁcients on deep determinants of growth are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This is true of years since ag-
ricultural transition, state antiquity, and technology adoption in columns 2, 3 and 4, respectively, as well as population density in
1500 and the ﬁrst principal component of the six indicators of early development as reported in columns 7 and 8, respectively. In
column 9, which includes all the controls, the coefﬁcient estimate of technology adoption is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level, while the point estimate on genetic proximity is signiﬁcant but with the wrong sign.
Finally, in the vast majority of cases, the null of exogenous instruments cannot be rejected at the 10% level. Over-identiﬁcation
test results using the CUE estimator, which provides the most reliable test of exogenous instruments, indicate that the null of con-
ditional exogeneity cannot be rejected at the 10% level in any of the nine speciﬁcations. Yet the null of under-identiﬁcation can be
rejected at the 5% level or better in all speciﬁcations except in column 9, but can be rejected at the 10% level, with a p-value of
0.052.
Based on the results from this section, the overall conclusion is that EFW, our main measure of economic institutions and pol-
icies, outperforms cognitive skills, arguably the best extant indicator of human capital, in predicting development. This conclusion
is bolstered by EFW's robustness to the application of different IV estimators, to the Anderson-Rubin as well as to the FAR infer-
ential tests. The statistically signiﬁcant concave effect on EFW of genetic diversity predicted and precolonial (unadjusted for inter-
regional migration ﬂows in the colonial era) is also remarkable. Finally, we also highlight the positive role of human capital, in this
section measured by years of education, on economic institution building.317. Concluding remarks
Three major ﬁndings emerge from this investigation. First, economic institutions and policies are strongly linked to develop-
ment. In effect, after accounting extensively for deep and proximate growth determinants, parameter estimates associated with30 This test was developed by Berkowitz, Caner and Fang (2008 and 2012).
31 Additional robustness checks, qualitatively corroborative of thehorse race results between EFWand cognitive skills presented in Table 5, are reported in SectionDof
the online Appendix.
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Table 5
Economic development horse race between human capital and institutions allowing for deep growth determinants (with competing identiﬁcation strategies).
Panel A. Second-stage results. Dependent variable is PWT 2010 log income pc
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Economic freedom 1985–2010 0.865*** 0.980*** 0.820*** 0.729*** 0.788*** 0.811*** 0.797*** 0.735*** 0.765***
[0.226] [0.243] [0.228] [0.148] [0.240] [0.235] [0.205] [0.163] [0.184]
Cognitive skills −0.031 −0.186 0.01 −0.122 0.079 0.052 −0.049 0.013 −0.129
[0.312] [0.326] [0.335] [0.278] [0.326] [0.311] [0.278] [0.215] [0.417]
Ethno diversity −1.192*** −0.987*** −1.083*** −1.092*** −0.935** −0.967** −1.133*** −1.144*** −1.247***
[0.387] [0.377] [0.362] [0.320] [0.406] [0.385] [0.360] [0.326] [0.345]
Latitude 0.825 0.918 0.714 0.684* 0.64 0.544 0.783 0.652 1.022*
[0.502] [0.565] [0.542] [0.367] [0.534] [0.603] [0.484] [0.400] [0.613]
Agricultural transition 0.114** 0.091
[0.050] [0.056]
State history 0.584 0.165
[0.388] [0.375]
Technology adoption 1.226 0.659
[0.771] [1.337]
Geo. proximity to regional frontier 0.561 −0.103
[0.463] [0.485]
Gen. proximity to global frontier 0.507 −0.404
[0.431] [0.637]
Population density in 1500 0.015** 0.002
[0.007] [0.007]
Principal component 0.206*
[0.121]
Constant 3.835*** 3.036*** 3.658*** 4.266*** 3.458*** 3.508*** 4.176*** 4.472*** 4.177***
[0.802] [0.859] [0.787] [0.597] [0.838] [0.807] [0.772] [0.651] [0.798]
Observations 64 62 63 56 63 63 63 54 54
p(OID) 0.079 0.114 0.045 0.193 0.066 0.147 0.156 0.277 0.011
p(UID) 0.005 0.034 0.031 0.01 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.052
p(AR) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.001
p(FAR) 0.015 0.023 0.02 0.038 0.019 0.025 0.018 0.02 0.041
Reps 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Kappa(FAR) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Robust standard errors in brackets. * p b 0.10, ** p b 0.05, *** p b 0.01. Fractionally Resampled Anderson Rubin (FAR) performed using parameters kappa = 3
and 10,000 repetitions.
Panel B1. First-stage with two-step bootstrapped standard errors. Dependent variable is economic freedom
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Genetic diversity ϟ 215.848*** 223.289*** 205.710*** 179.953*** 214.357*** 217.151*** 210.088*** 186.956*** 153.255**
[61.371] [67.049] [57.291] [58.337] [58.491] [57.852] [60.533] [55.331] [66.075]
Genetic diversity
squared ϟ
−162.448*** −168.260*** −155.254*** −135.686*** −161.294*** −163.369*** −158.606*** −140.552*** −115.131**
[45.481] [50.139] [42.692] [43.711] [43.488] [42.821] [45.180] [41.412] [49.450]
Ethno diversity −0.014 0.031 0.066 0.308 0.204 0.191 0.044 0.249 0.508
[0.380] [0.397] [0.387] [0.446] [0.396] [0.407] [0.403] [0.439] [0.688]
Latitude 1.057 1.179 1.029 0.586 0.996 0.672 1.09 0.318 −0.225
[0.907] [1.018] [0.897] [1.081] [0.966] [0.902] [0.939] [1.150] [1.374]
Years of schooling 0.157*** 0.154** 0.155*** 0.174*** 0.155*** 0.151*** 0.135** 0.195*** 0.173**
[0.050] [0.061] [0.053] [0.063] [0.056] [0.047] [0.056] [0.062] [0.074]
Catholic 1900 −0.109 −0.131 −0.168 −0.215 −0.209 −0.178 −0.243 −0.25 −0.398
[0.288] [0.293] [0.306] [0.299] [0.327] [0.290] [0.322] [0.301] [0.398]
Agricultural
transition
0.016 −0.144
[0.067] [0.136]
State history 0.436 −0.114
[0.420] [0.835]
Technology
adoption
0.867 1.216
[0.836] [1.680]
Geo. proximity to
regional frontier
0.632 0.813
[0.709] [1.339]
Gen. proximity to
global frontier
0.626 0.341
[0.582] [1.170]
Population density
in 1500
0.016 0.012
[0.010] [0.014]
Principal component 0.196
[0.198]
Constant −65.387*** −67.844*** −62.055*** −53.999*** −65.364*** −66.183*** −63.326*** −55.932*** −45.564**
[20.554] [22.390] [19.107] [19.348] [19.663] [19.392] [20.073] [18.374] [21.790]
Optimum genetic
diversity
0.664*** 0.664*** 0.662*** 0.663*** 0.664*** 0.665*** 0.662*** 0.665*** 0.666***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.015] [0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.013] [0.050]
(continued on next page)
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Table 5 (continued)
Panel B1. First-stage with two-step bootstrapped standard errors. Dependent variable is economic freedom
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Adj. R-sq. 0.471 0.444 0.469 0.516 0.473 0.471 0.484 0.496 0.471
Obs. 64 62 63 56 63 63 63 54 54
Replications 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Panel B2. First-stage with two-step bootstrapped standard errors. Dependent variable is cognitive skills
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Genetic diversity ϟ 104.687** 122.791*** 85.153** 44.779 104.157** 106.584** 93.423** 71.851 5.173
[46.301] [44.490] [38.483] [42.489] [42.204] [42.901] [36.586] [44.821] [40.868]
Genetic diversity squared ϟ −75.729** −89.871*** −61.194** −30.998 −75.325** −77.168** −67.861** −50.722 −1.646
[33.982] [32.903] [28.303] [31.973] [31.018] [31.626] [26.971] [33.638] [30.834]
Ethno diversity −0.693 −0.428 −0.446 −0.039 −0.549 −0.605 −0.616* −0.302 0.046
[0.430] [0.386] [0.383] [0.330] [0.404] [0.394] [0.355] [0.374] [0.409]
Latitude 0.741 0.975 0.683 0.038 0.715 0.626 0.7 0.067 0.295
[0.610] [0.656] [0.591] [0.637] [0.676] [0.663] [0.619] [0.801] [0.693]
Years of schooling 1960–2010 0.119*** 0.110*** 0.128*** 0.101*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.089*** 0.128*** 0.092**
[0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.036] [0.038] [0.039] [0.034] [0.044] [0.044]
Catholic 1900 −0.332* −0.336** −0.266 −0.342** −0.400* −0.377* −0.513** −0.458** −0.217
[0.190] [0.167] [0.181] [0.158] [0.210] [0.205] [0.219] [0.191] [0.211]
Agricultural transition 0.098*** −0.059
[0.038] [0.067]
State history 0.894*** 0.089
[0.321] [0.518]
Technology adoption 2.030*** 3.066***
[0.536] [0.776]
Geo. proximity to regional frontier 0.412 0.475
[0.401] [0.584]
Gen. proximity to global frontier 0.276 −1.358**
[0.346] [0.593]
Population density in 1500 0.024*** 0.011
[0.008] [0.009]
Principal component 0.355***
[0.129]
Constant −32.095** −38.435** −26.147** −13.469 −32.218** −32.865** −28.188** −21.39 −0.31
[15.583] [14.949] [12.921] [13.967] [14.238] [14.392] [12.245] [14.823] [13.337]
Optimum genetic diversity 0.691*** 0.683 0.696*** 0.722 0.691*** 0.691*** 0.688** 0.708 1.571
[0.165] [0.931] [0.078] [10.968] [0.145] [0.200] [0.275] [1.776] [3.515]
Adj. R-sq. 0.604 0.635 0.659 0.733 0.602 0.596 0.665 0.679 0.764
Obs. 64 62 63 56 63 63 63 54 54
Replications 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Panel C. LIML estimator. Dependent variable is PWT 2010 log income pc
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Economic freedom 1985–2010 1.003*** 1.163*** 0.984** 0.759*** 0.941** 0.906*** 0.884*** 0.755*** 0.993
[0.330] [0.376] [0.386] [0.171] [0.410] [0.325] [0.268] [0.182] [0.615]
Cognitive skills −0.22 −0.433 −0.209 −0.169 −0.121 −0.069 −0.155 −0.009 −0.653
[0.493] [0.540] [0.615] [0.326] [0.599] [0.456] [0.373] [0.243] [1.732]
Observations 64 62 63 56 63 63 63 54 54
p(OID) 0.149 0.22 0.115 0.221 0.14 0.189 0.216 0.296 0.086
p(UID) 0.005 0.034 0.031 0.01 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.052
Robust standard errors in brackets. * p b 0.10, ** p b 0.05, *** p b 0.01. To save space, just pertinent Horse Race variables shown.
Panel D. CUE estimator. Dependent variable is PWT 2010 log income pc
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Economic freedom 1985–2010 1.087*** 1.240*** 1.122*** 0.807*** 1.061*** 1.016*** 0.954*** 0.812*** 1.403***
[0.230] [0.267] [0.245] [0.145] [0.256] [0.245] [0.198] [0.163] [0.419]
Cognitive skills −0.387 −0.549 −0.513 −0.262 −0.337 −0.268 −0.263 −0.091 −0.413
[0.348] [0.394] [0.393] [0.275] [0.384] [0.352] [0.285] [0.220] [0.756]
Observations 64 62 63 56 63 63 63 54 54
p(OID) 0.158 0.19 0.145 0.218 0.147 0.191 0.232 0.305 0.2
p(UID) 0.005 0.034 0.031 0.01 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.052
Robust standard errors in brackets. * p b 0.10, ** p b 0.05, *** p b 0.01. To save space, just pertinent Horse Race variables shown, estimated by the Continuously
Updated Estimator.
Ϟ Predicted Genetic Diversity Ancestry Unadjusted
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the colonial era, are found to be persistently positive, statistically signiﬁcant, and relatively stable.
Second, human capital gauged by cognitive skills exerts a strong effect on institutions. Indeed, in nearly all ﬁrst-stage regres-
sions, cognitive skills estimates are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This ﬁnding is congruous with the hypoth-
esis of human capital promoting institutions. However, the data primarily suggests that cognitive skills' direct effect on
development is nil after accounting in the ﬁrst stage for its effect on institutions.
Third, the robustness of the hump-shaped relationship of predicted genetic diversity, unadjusted for cross-country population
ﬂows in the post-1500 era, on economic institutions is remarkable. In fact, in the vast majority of the ﬁrst-stage regressions, both
the linear and quadratic terms are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with the notion of a genetic
channel inﬂuencing the quality of economic institutions and attests to the relevancy (strength) of our instrumental variables.
Horse race results between economic institutions and human capital appear to reinforce the previously mentioned ﬁnding of
economic institutions, but not human capital, exerting a direct effect on growth. Indeed, EFW seems clearly to dominate cognitive
skills in predicting economic development. In most cases, cognitive skills are not statistically signiﬁcant, whereas in an over-
whelming number of cases, economic institutions are positively and statistically signiﬁcantly linked to long-term development.
Overall, the main contribution of this research to the comparative economic development literature is to lend credence to the
primacy-of-institutions-and-policies hypothesis for long-term economic growth. More speciﬁcally, it is to follow the policy sugges-
tions embedded in the EFW index such as rule of law, sound money, regulations promoting well-functioning markets, openness,
simpliﬁed and limited taxation, inter alia. Human capital appears to have no direct effect on development; nevertheless, it has a
critical role—to promote economic institutions of better quality. Accordingly, our empirical evidence based on cross-country
growth regressions unbundles the roles of multidimensional indices of economic institutions and human capital in development.
Three additional ﬁndings are worth mentioning. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization typically is negative and statistically signiﬁ-
cant at the 1% level in the second stage but, interestingly, it is never signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stage. This is most likely due to the
inclusion of genetic diversity (see Ashraf and Galor, 2013b). Geography seems to play a greater role in shaping the quality of
institutions than in directly affecting development.
Statistical tests suggest that the IVs used in this paper are exogenous, which is to say they inﬂuence development only through
EFW. Further, in all but two speciﬁcations, the null of under-identiﬁcation is rejected at the 5% level or better (in the other two at
the 10% level). In no regression model with a single endogenous variable is the null of the exclusion restriction rejected. Only in
Table 4, column 1, however, can we reject the null of the IVs' inﬂuencing development exclusively through the institutional chan-
nel at the 10% level. In other words, statistical tests suggest that the IVs used in this paper are exogenous, which is to say they
inﬂuence development only through EFW, our main multidimensional indicator of economic institutions and policies. Additional
persuasive evidence consistent with the notion of using instruments that are a plausible source of exogenous variation for EFW is
provided by numerous falsiﬁcation tests and reduced-form regressions.
The results also decisively suggest that the critical policy lever informing policymakers to ignite long-term economic develop-
ment is the quality of economic institutions and not genetic diversity. For example, our income reduced-form regressions clearly
indicate that, in the presence of EFW, precolonial genetic diversity does not impart any statistically discernible effect on contem-
porary income. Moreover, even in the reduced-form regressions of Ashraf and Galor (2013a) genetic diversity has relatively little
power to explain development. Indeed, after allowing for timing of the Neolithic transition, land productivity, and continent ﬁxed
effects (Ashraf and Galor do not control for EFW nor cognitive skills), they ﬁnd that precolonial genetic diversity only explains 7%
of population density (the appropriate measure of development during the Malthusian epoch) in the year 1500.32
Accordingly, attempts to alter genetic diversity today, for example, through a policy of enticing immigrants with certain genetic
structures, would be not only ethically questionable but highly inefﬁcient in terms of the time that would be required for this
indirect procedure to improve the quality of institutions and policies. Augmenting the quality of human capital as measured by
cognitive skills would be both more expeditious and salutary to the economy in terms of a better-educated workforce and poten-
tial positive spillover effects.
Importantly, although this paper has unveiled the existence of a channel from precolonial and predicted genetic diversity to
economic institutions, consideration must be extended to an available channel from economic institutions to genetic traits. For
example, Galor and Moav (2002, 2007) provide evidence supporting the view that the Neolithic transition—a change of the
rules of the game—provoked an evolutionary process giving rise to a natural selection of some traits complementary to economic
development, such as preference for higher-quality children and enhanced entrepreneurial spirit.
Given the primacy of economic institutions for sustained long-term growth, highlighted by empirical results revealed in this
paper, and the apparent institutional incidence on modifying human traits, some of them potentially genetic, we suggest the
following dynamic interpretation of our results. First, economic institutional quality is enhanced which, over a relatively short
time period, starts to deliver increased growth. The population experiences rising living standards and “learns by doing” that
the change of rules is mostly responsible for their augmented welfare. Improved future prospects and greater demands for skills
associated with an expanding economy lead to more and better educational quality. This increase in human capital in turn pro-
motes higher institutional quality. Thus a virtuous circle of enriched institutions and human capital is triggered by the initial32 In thewake of the Industrial Revolution, income per capita growth has accelerated, prompting a process characterized by numerous countries escaping theMalthu-
sian trap of income stagnation. A critical ramiﬁcation of the Industrial Revolution is the Grand Transition, which encompasses transitions to lower fertility rates, in-
creased urbanism, diffusion of democratic rule, enhanced honesty (less corruption) and secularism. For a lucid explanation and documentation of these issues, see
several contributions by Gundlach and Paldam (2009a, 2009b and 2012).
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20 H.J. Faria et al. / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxinstitutional reform. If this initial institutional reform takes place under substantial backwardness and a relatively high level of
human capital, e.g., China and India, growth may be explosive. Other countries with a development pattern broadly consistent
with this virtuous circle are Hong Kong, Singapore, Chile and even the U.S. We leave the question of an existing virtuous circle
as an issue to be researched in the future.
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